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BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS: ITS RELEVANCE TO PUBLIC 
INVESTMENT DECISIONS: COMMENT* 
ROBERT H. HAVEMAN 
In a recent issue of this Journal,' Arthur Maass urges a major 
revision in the application of benefit-cost analysis to public invest- 
ment expenditures based on a substantive overhaul of the theoretical 
welfare basis of such applied analysis. Contemporary benefit-cost 
practice, he argues, is neither very useful nor very relevant because 
of its preoccupation with efficiency. Because the objectives of most 
public expenditures are primarily concerned with the redistribution 
of income rather than economic efficiency, the redistribution ob- 
jective needs to be raised to a primal position in the evaluation of 
public investments. In his paper, Professor Maass presents both 
his views on the essential revisions in theoretical welfare economics 
and a proposal for incorporating these revisions into benefit-cost 
practice. 
While Maass quite correctly recognizes that, given the constraints 
on pure income transfers, the redistribution consequences of public 
investments are of importance and must be incorporated into the 
decision process, it will here be argued that (1) welfare economists 
have already dealt with this precise issue, and (2) the Maass pro- 
posal for revising benefit-cost practice cannot, for several reasons, 
be taken seriously. 
Prominent in the Maass paper is the implication that his con- 
cern for the redistribution implications of public investments fills 
what has been a theoretical and empirical void in the field of eco- 
nomics. Such implication is without warrant. Over a decade ago 
both Professors Little 2 and Meade 3 analyzed the redistribution 
issue in terms similar to Maass's but with substantially more pre- 
cision. Likewise, the concept of a multidimensional investment 
criterion including income redistribution as an element has been 
recently applied in at least two empirical welfare analyses.4 
* The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments of J. C. 
Headley, C. W. Howe, B. Bower, R. Steinberg and, especially, J. V. Krutilla. 
1. Arthur Maass, "Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public In- 
vestment Decisions," this Journal, LXXX (May 1966), 208-26. 
2. I.M.D. Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1950), Chap. VI, pp. 98 ff., Chap. VII, pp. 115 fif. 
3. J. E. Meade, The Theory of International Economic Policy, Vol. II: 
Trade and Welfare (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), Chaps. V 
and VII. 
4. See Robert H. Haveman, Water Resource Investment and the Public 
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Nowhere in his paper does Maass betray any understanding of 
the distinction between benefit-cost and cost effectiveness analysis. 
Instead, he lumps together both public investments undertaken to 
correct market failure in the private sector and public expenditures 
designed to promote some aspect of the welfare of various disadvan- 
taged groups. In so doing, Maass finds himself applying benefit-cost 
analysis both to public investments in which the efficiency content 
is of primary significance and efficiency impacts are measurable 
and to equity-based public expenditures in which the efficiency con- 
tent is insignificant and the efficiency impacts are largely nonmeasur- 
able. His insistence on analyzing these latter expenditure types 
through benefit-cost analysis rather than through the appropriate 
tool of cost-effectiveness analysis accounts, in large measure, for the 
inadequacy of his policy proposal.5 Can the efficiency content in any 
one of the existing equity (welfare) -based public expenditure pro- 
grams be identified? Can a meaningful trade-off ratio between 
efficiency and equity be established for such programs on the basis 
of the identification? The answer, it appears, is negative, but, in any 
case, the burden of demonstration rests on Maass. 
Throughout his paper, Maass equates the distributional impact 
of a public expenditure with the disbursement pattern of project 
benefits. He completely neglects the other channels by which public 
expenditures redistribute income. Consequently, the relevant concept 
of the net redistribution impact of an expenditure remains unrecog- 
nized and the analyst's ability to sift out the true redistribution im- 
pact is appraised with substantial overoptimism. Given the extreme 
difficulty of even roughly estimating the distributional pattern of 
(a) the resources withdrawn to finance nonreimbursable project 
costs, (b) the factor payments represented by the construction ex- 
penditure, (c) the secondary or indirect gains and losses, to say 
nothing of (d) the disbursement of benefits, the substantive im- 
provements in public decisionmaking expected by Maass from a 
Congressional vote on trade-off ratios become chimerical. 
Because of this naive view of the redistribution mechanism, 
Interest (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965) and A. 
Myrick Freeman III, "The Federal Reclamation Program and The Distribu- 
tion of Income," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, 1965. 
5. It is the existence of incommensurable costs and gains which generally 
necessitates cost effectiveness as opposed to benefit-cost analysis. In cost 
effectiveness analysis, the scale of either gains or costs is fixed and, as a rule, 
chosen apart from the analysis itself. See Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. 
McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 175-77 and A. R. Prest and R. Turvey, 
"Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey," Economic Journal, LXXV (Dec. 1965), 
727-28. 
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Maass reinforces the unsubstantiated but widely accepted view that 
efficiency short-falls in public water resource investments are jus- 
tified in that such investments do in general redistribute income in 
the "right" direction. Of the several purposes which water resource 
development serves, reclamation and power are the ones most likely 
to have favorable income redistribution consequences to, say, con- 
sumers or "family-sized" farm proprietors. At least three research 
efforts have dealt with the direction of the net redistribution impact 
of these programs. 
In a recent study, Freeman 6 addressed both the question of the 
direction of the redistribution consequences of reclamation projects 
and that of whether or not they would all pass a "joint" test if in- 
crements of income and cost were weighted differently depending 
upon the income class of recipients and taxees. Freeman concluded 
that while the projects in his sample "were distributing income in 
the 'right' direction," the short-fall in efficiency benefits relative to 
costs was by no means compensated for by "redistribution bene- 
fits."7 
While Freeman's findings appear to support Maass's implicit 
assumption on the direction of the redistribution involved in re- 
clamation expenditures, the work of George Tolley 8 is also relevant. 
After analyzing the impact of the western reclamation program, 
Tolley concluded that about $500 million worth of southern agri- 
cultural production or one southern farm worker in every twenty 
had been displaced by the reclamation program hardly an im- 
pact in the "right" direction. Similarly, Krutilla and Eckstein9 
traced the distribution of costs and benefits from a power project 
in the Pacific Northwest. Assuming that the project had been 
financed through a tax reduction favoring consumption, over 75 per 
cent of the redistribution was found to have occurred at the expense 
of income classes of $7,500 and under. 
Finally, a recent study I dealing with the distribution of income 
6. Op. cit. 
7. Much the same result was obtained in a study applying a multi- 
dimensional criterion function including income redistribution to some $2.5 
billion of Corps of Engineers projects. Roughly one out of five projects were 
found to be unacceptable even when substantial allowance for "income re- 
distribution benefits" was included in the calculation. See Haveman, op. cit., 
pp. 125-55. 
8. George S. Tolley, "Reclamation's Influence on the Rest of Agriculture," 
Land Economics, XXXV (May 1959). 
9. John V. Krutilla and Otto Eckstein, Multiple Purpose River Develop- 
ment: Studies in Applied Economic Analysis (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1958), Chap. IV, VII, and VIII. 
1. This study is being undertaken by the author and J. V. Krutilla and, 
as of this writing, is still in progress. 
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payments generated by all categories of water project construction 
has shown that it is not the low wage-high unemployment occupa- 
tions which are demanded by water project construction; rather it 
is the higher income craftsmen which supply the bulk of labor re- 
quirements. Moreover, because of the regional pattern of industrial 
capacity, it is estimated that the southeast, the lowest income region 
in the nation, secures only a minute share of the income generated in 
projects constructed elsewhere in the country and retains less than 
one-third of the output generated by material demands from projects 
constructed within its bounds. 
When we consider water resource development purposes ad- 
ditional to power and irrigation, there is still less reason to suppose 
that the expenditure of public funds results in a favorable redistribu- 
tion. Shareholders in Federal Barge Lines, Peabody Coal, and 
Bethlehem Steel do not appear to be particularly more worthy than 
those who finance public waterway investment-and certainly not to 
the extent by which the social return from, say, the Arkansas River 
Navigation Project falls short of its social cost. It is likewise doubt- 
ful that flood plain real estate developers receiving land enhance- 
ment windfall gains from federal flood protection measures are more 
worthy than the taxpayers financing such projects. 
On the basis of the available evidence then, the presumption 
pervading the Maass paper appears hardly warranted. The odds 
seem better than even that the direction of the income distribution 
resulting from public water resource investment accentuates rather 
than ameliorates the well-known efficiency short-falls. 
Basic to the Maass proposal is a pair of judgments which, 
because of the potential mischief which they may well create, need 
to be made explicit and subjected to critical, examination. These 
judgments are: (a) that public decisionmaking would become more 
effective if Congress, with prodding from the Executive, would elect 
a trade-off ratio between redistribution and efficiency benefits to 
be incorporated into the design criterion for project planning, and 
(b) that Congress has the sheer ability thus to discipline itself 
overtly in the area of public investment expenditures. 
With regard to the first judgment, it is here suggested that 
effective long-term investment planning could not survive the certain 
oscillation of the policy trade-offs spun-off by the Congress. Be- 
cause there is no single policymaker who is both rational and con- 
sistent, but rather a transient group of policymakers who, as a group, 
are neither rational nor consistent, Maass is required to demon- 
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strate that effective planning is capable of coping with such chang- 
ing signals if his proposal is to be taken seriously. 
With regard to the second judgment, a previous Congressional 
effort to impose guidelines on its actions needs to be recalled. Feel- 
ing a sense of outrage by the Bureau of the Budget's Circular A-47, 
the Senate of the eighty-fourth Congress sought to put things into 
proper perspective and resolved: 
Sec. 4. That reports to the Congress in support of requests for authorization 
of projects for the conservation and development of land and water resources 
should include evaluations made in accordance with criteria prescribed by the 
Congressional committees having jurisdiction of the subject matter....2 
Having so resolved, the Senate became appalled by the implications 
of its initiative and became completely paralyzed attempting to pre- 
scribe binding criteria. In fact, a Congress later, word went out 
from Capitol Hill that the affected agencies were rather to provide 
data on projects on the basis of a wide variety of alternative pro- 
cedures and criteria and Congress would take its pick. Ten years 
have now elapsed since the fateful initiative and as yet there is no 
hint of an unequivocal and mutually consistent set of Congressional 
criteria. No greater success is anticipated for the Maass proposal. 
In conclusion, it has been argued that, given institutional con- 
straints on pure taxation - subsidy schemes, Maass's recognition of 
the income redistribution consequences of public expenditures and 
the need to account for them in the decisionmaking process is both 
appropriate and correct. However, because of his failure to recog- 
nize (a) the complex nature of the redistribution mechanism and the 
need for addressing the concept of net income redistribution, (b) the 
difficulty of identifying the efficiency content of basically welfare 
programs, and (c) the deleterious and costly impact on the planning 
process of constantly changing design parameters, the adoption of 
his proposed revisions of benefit-cost practice cannot be supported. 
2. S. Res. 281, 84th Congress, 2d Session. 
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